Spatial location and its relevance for terminological inferences in bio-ontologies by Schulz, Stefan et al.
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Bioinformatics
Open Access Research article
Spatial location and its relevance for terminological inferences in 
bio-ontologies
Stefan Schulz*1,3, Kornél Markó1,2 and Udo Hahn2
Address: 1Medical Informatics Department, Freiburg University Hospital, Freiburg, Germany, 2Language and Information Engineering (JULIE) 
Lab, Jena University, Germany and 3Master Program in Health Technology, Pontificial Catholic University of Paraná, Curtiba, Brazil
Email: Stefan Schulz* - stschulz@uni-freiburg.de; Kornél Markó - kornel.marko@uni-freiburg.de; Udo Hahn - Udo.Hahn@uni-jena.de
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
Background: An adequate and expressive ontological representation of biological organisms and
their parts requires formal reasoning mechanisms for their relations of physical aggregation and
containment.
Results: We demonstrate that the proposed formalism allows to deal consistently with "role
propagation along non-taxonomic hierarchies", a problem which had repeatedly been identified as
an intricate reasoning problem in biomedical ontologies.
Conclusion: The proposed approach seems to be suitable for the redesign of compositional
hierarchies in (bio)medical terminology systems which are embedded into the framework of the
OBO (Open Biological Ontologies) Relation Ontology and are using knowledge representation
languages developed by the Semantic Web community.
1 Background
Research activities in the "omics" sciences yield an ever-
growing content of experimental data and publications,
which are stored in a large variety of databases. For meta-
data descriptions and mediation between these resources
a large number of bio-ontologies have evolved. In a simi-
lar vein, medical terminology and classification systems
have been developed in order to improve medical docu-
mentation and data analysis.
Whereas naive methods of ontology engineering (typi-
cally, the ad-hoc assembly of concept trees and graphs)
were prevailing in the past, the claim is increasingly
expressed for a more principled approach, based upon
logics and formal ontology design methodologies. (We
here understand by formal ontologies representational
artifacts which use a formal language to describe entities
and their relations in the domain of choice.) The need for
taming the mass of newly generated domain knowledge
requires sophisticated and rigid computational methods
to support semantic interoperability on a large scale. This
can only be fulfilled when discretionary modeling deci-
sions and implicit semantic assumptions underlying the
assembly of terms and relations are avoided, as much as
possible.
This paper is structured in the following way. First we will
address taxonomies and partonomies as the main hierar-
chical principles in the context of concrete instances of
bio-ontologies. We will introduce relations considered
canonical to relate entities in our domain. In this context
we will focus on boundary problems related to parthood
and location. The central part of the paper is dedicated to
the so-called "role propagation" phenomenon, a reason-
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ing pattern that is of high relevance for the domain. We
will compare two approaches to represent this type of
inferencing and provide recommendations for a parsimo-
nious and ontologically adequate model.
2 Taxonomic Aspects in Bio-Ontologies
2.1 A Simple Upper Ontology
In the following we focus on organisms and their physical
components which are referred to as Biological Objects.
According to a simplified upper ontology (see Fig. 1),
which roughly follows the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO)
[1,17], Biological Objects are classified as Objects that are
Independent Continuants. According to BFO, Continuants
are those entities in the world that persist through time by
being present in their entirety at every point in time at
which they exist. Organisms, populations, organs, cells,
cell components, molecules, and atoms are examples for
BFO Objects. BFO Objects as Independent Continuants are
opposed to Spatial regions on the one hand, and Dependent
Continuants on the other hand. (Dependent Continuants are
further divided into Qualities and Realizable Entities such
as functions, roles, and dispositions, which are not an
issue in this paper.)
At the uppermost level, we distinguish Continuants from
Occurrents. According to BFO, Occurrents are those entities
in the world which change in time. This means that each
portion of the time during which an occurrent occurs cor-
responds to a temporal portion of the occurrent, because
occurrents exist only in their successive temporal parts,
phases [16], or stages [9].
Occurrents are characterized by their ontological depend-
ency on Continuants. For instance, every instance of the
occurrent  Cell Differentiation Process involves some
instance of the continuant Cell.
As there is no uncontroversially accepted criterion for sub-
dividing occurrents in terms of processes, events, changes,
or actions, we do not make any further distinction.
Placing these categories into a context of biology, we end
up with three disjoint (though not exhaustive) classes, viz.
Biological Site, Biological Object, and Biological Occurrent,
which are sufficient for our further considerations.
As familiar as the hierarchical arrangement of classes in a
taxonomic framework may seem at the first sight, some
clarification is necessary. First of all, the relationships
between classes at the ontological layer and concrete indi-
vidual entities in the world have to be characterized. We
deliberately refrain from a principled discussion (which
would have to cover nearly 2500 years of philosophy,
beginning with Aristotle and addressing several controver-
sial strands of philosophical thinking). We rather axio-
matically introduce the relation instance_of, which
relates an individual entity with the classes it belongs to.
According to the OBO Relation Ontology [44], its domain
and range do not overlap: No class can be instance_of
anything, and individuals can never be instantiated. The
division between classes and individuals is often treated
in a fuzzy fashion, especially in naive approaches to ontol-
ogy engineering. It may be tempting to describe, e.g.
Serotonin_Receptor as instance_of Protein but then the rep-
resentation of Serotonin_Receptor_2A would be impossible
since an instance cannot be instantiated itself [33]. From
a strict ontological point of view, even
Serotonin_Receptor_2A would be a class (unless it is meant
to refer to a single molecule or a defined amount of mol-
ecules, cf. [40]).
In line with the OBO Relation Ontology, we introduce the
taxonomic subsumption relation Is-A  by the following
axiom:
∀A, B : (Class(A) ∧ Class(B) ∧ Is_A(A, B) =
def ∀x :(instance_of(x, A) ⇒ instance_of(x, B)))
(1)
This relation is equivalent to class subsumption in
description logics [5] where the notation: A  B is used.
Is-A relates specific with more general classes and it con-
stitutes the organizational principle of taxonomic hierar-
chies.
A simplified upper ontology for biology Figure 1
A simplified upper ontology for biology. Siblings are disjoint 
but not exhaustive.
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According to [44], classes and relationships between
classes are represented by using italic font; we use bold
face for all other relations.
2.2 Common Bio-Ontologies and their Architecture
The class Biological Object (as introduced above) occupies
a prominent space in bio-ontologies, covering the whole
range from biomolecules to organisms. The pivotal role of
Biological Object is due to the fact that its descendants form
the backbone of any principled bio-ontological approach.
Apart from the fact that the study of their structural prop-
erties is of utmost importance in molecular biology and
genomics, biological functions inhere  in biological
objects, biological objects participate in biological occur-
rents, e.g. in biochemical pathways, and they are the sub-
ject to a broad range of experimental or therapeutic
manipulations in biology and medicine.
There are numerous examples for Biological Object ontolo-
gies such as
￿ The Cellular Component branch of the Gene Ontology
(GO) [14], describing species-independent relations
between cell components;
￿ The ontology of Chemical Entities of Biological Interest
(ChEBI) [12];
￿ Many animal and plant anatomies hosted by the Open
Biological Ontologies (OBO) platform [23];
￿ The Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA) [31,32], which
describes the canonical anatomy of the adult human, with
a focus on macroscopic anatomy;
￿ The "anatomy" schema of the GALEN CORE model
[2,29];
￿ The "anatomy" part of the NCI Thesaurus [18];
￿ The "anatomy" branch of SNOMED CT [3].
As a kind of unifying principle, the nodes in ontologies of
biological objects are mostly arranged in a directed acyclic
graph, using a bipartite hierarchical structure:
Taxonomic links associate specific with general classes
using the relation Is-A, whereas mereological links [46]
associate parts and wholes.
3 Mereological Aspects in Bio-Ontologies
3.1 The Meaning of "Part"
According to our stipulations, relations between parts and
wholes require a principled account under the following
aspects:
1. There must be a clear commitment to formal properties,
i.e. in terms of transitivity, reflexivity and symmetry, as
well as domain and range.
2. The wide-spread use of relations such as "part-of" and
"has-part" between classes seems intuitive at a first sight,
but is ambiguous and contrasts with the classical
approach to mereology [43], which focuses on individual
entities, and not classes of entities.
3. It has to be made explicit whether parts and wholes
should be understood in a either functional or a purely
locative sense and how temporal aspects are treated. The
boundary to other relations should be made clear.
None of the ontologies of biological continuants men-
tioned above make sufficient claims regarding these three
controversial issues.
FMA and GO have a clear commitment to item 1, at least
regarding the transitivity property of the general "part-of"
relation. The same applies to GALEN with regard to "part-
of" subrelations [29]. This view is mainly consistent with
classical (i.e., axiomatic) mereology [10,43] which treats
generic parthood as reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive,
with  proper parthood as its irreflexive variant, excluding
equality. It is the latter one which better fits the habitual
understanding of "part-of" in biology. In contrast to this,
the OBO Relation Ontology has recently introduced the
"part-of" relation as a reflexive one [44].
Concerning other formal properties, such as extensional-
ity, supplementation, or the treatment of time [7,9,43],
none of the specialized biomedical terminology system
takes up a defined position. With regard to the time
aspect, the OBO Relation Ontology introduces the rela-
tion derives-from which includes the notion of what can be
called historic parthood. Hence a DNA extracted from a cell
is no longer "part-of" it. Implicitly, the mereological rela-
tions are restricted to continuants. Parts of occurrents are
considered in SNOMED CT [3] but they are not identified
as such [39].
Relating classes using mereological relations (item 2) is
very common. However, semantic network style asser-
tions such as part-of(CellNucleus, Cell), are so ambiguous
that conflicting interpretations are likely to evolve: So did
the Gene Ontology use to define this relation as follows:
"part-of means can be a part of, not is always a part of". In
the meanwhile this definition has changed to "The part-of
relationship used in GO is usually (...) necessarily is part"
[15]. In contrast, the Foundational Model of Anatomy
(FMA) [32] uses class-level mereological relations in the
following way: part-of(A, B) means that any instance of B
has an instance of A as part and any instance of A is partBMC Bioinformatics 2007, 8:134 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2105/8/134
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of an instance of B [45] (This leads to problematic asser-
tions such as part-of(Rectum, Female Pelvis)).
In this paper, we exclusively use mereological relations
which hold between individual entities. Wherever they are
used in class definitions quantifications will be used.
A rudimentary commitment to item 3 is reflected by the
introduction of several mereological subrelations in FMA
and GALEN [30]. For a more recent discussion of such
subrelations, with a strong emphasis on biology, we refer
to [8,21,26] who focus on the transitivity of mereological
relations. According to [47], apparently plausible state-
ments such as "The nucleus of a cell is not a part of the organ
which that cell is part of " do not really challenge the
assumption that the classical parthood relation is truly
governed by formal ontological principles. It is rather the
expression of an implicit narrowing of the sense of "part",
which commonly happens in ordinary discourse. Taking
the above statement, it holds true if we read "part" as
"functional part", but not if we consider parthood in the
broadest sense.
We here follow the OBO recommendations [44] and axi-
omatically introduce the relation part_of and its inverse
has_part as transitive, antisymmetric, and reflexive rela-
tions which can be asserted either between pairs of contin-
uants or between pairs of occurrents.
In addition we introduce the irreflexive parthood rela-
tions  proper_part_of  and  has_proper_part. Parthood
relations between classes are not considered because they
can be defined in terms of part_of such as introduced in
[44].
3.2 The Puzzle of the Parthood/Containment Distinction in 
Biology
When we describe biological objects, it is often difficult to
decide whether two objects are related in terms of part-
hood or in terms of a weaker relation of spatial inclusion.
To a much higher degree than can be observed with arti-
facts, living biological entities continuously exchange
matter with their environment. Typical examples are
phagocytosis, pinocytosis, and exocytosis, such as
depicted Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. In contrast to artifacts, there is
no clear distinction between a system's constituents and
its substrates. In contrast, as far as a mechanical engine is
concerned, the material of which it consists is clearly dis-
tinct from the fuel it consumes and the exhaust-gas it pro-
duces.
Let us consider the following example: A carbon atom
(e.g. as part of a carbohydrate) is ingested through the ali-
mentary system where it can play quite different roles: It
may merely participate in the organism's "power supply",
after which it is eliminated by the lungs as part of a CO2
molecule or it may be integrated into the organism's con-
stitutional structure, e.g. as part of a collagen fiber which
then remains stable in the organism for years (cf. [35] for
more examples of this kind). Other controversial exam-
ples on the cell level include small molecules and ions, as
well as endosymbionts like mitochondria and chloro-
plasts. Another example is the reproduction process: A
spermatozoon fuses with an oocyte then the male and
female pronuclei form and merge. Afterwards the chro-
mosomes are re-arranged, a zygote is formed and, finally,
its cleavage is initiated. So it can be controversially dis-
cussed at which phase of this process which components
of the original oocyte cease to be part of the female organ-
ism in which the oocyte has developed.
Organisms interact with other organisms as well. If a virus
is in a cell, it is certainly not part of this cell. At which stage
Prototypical Cell from a salivary gland: Are the secretions  produced in the cell also part_of the cell or are they merely  contained within them? Figure 3
Prototypical Cell from a salivary gland: Are the secretions 
produced in the cell also part_of the cell or are they merely 
contained within them?
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Phagocytosis of a virus by a cell: At which stage(s) one can  state that components of the ingested virus are not only con- tained in but also part_of the cell? Figure 2
Phagocytosis of a virus by a cell: At which stage(s) one can 
state that components of the ingested virus are not only con-
tained in but also part_of the cell?
Virus
CellBMC Bioinformatics 2007, 8:134 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2105/8/134
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of the process of digestion (phagocytosis) do virus or bac-
teria components become parts of the ingesting cell (cf.
Fig. 2) is difficult to delimit. Considering the cells which
produce secretions (cf. Fig. 3), are these substances part of
those cells or are they merely located within them? Many
tissues such as the intestinal mucosa or the endometrium
undergo permanent renovation, i.e. discharge of cells. Are
these cells still part of the original tissue or not?
3.3 Spatial Location
In order to bring light into the parthood/containment
dilemma, we introduce location as a new primitive for spa-
tial aggregation of biological objects. Every instance of a
continuant or an occurrent occupies a unique spatial
region at every moment in time at which it exists. Accord-
ing to the Basic Inclusion Theory (BIT) [11] we introduce
here the primitive region_of(e), a function of an individ-
ual entity e, the value of which is the spatial region s that
e fully occupies. This corresponds to the region function r
in BIT. In contrast to BIT, we here also allow occurrents to
have a spatial location. We here define the region an
occurrent fully occupies as the mereological fusion of all
regions occupied by any stage (instantaneous part [9]) of
this occurrent during its lifetime.
Using this notion of region, we define the relation
located_in  between two entities as follows: entity x  is
located_in entity y if and only if the region occupied by x
is part of the region occupied by y.
∀x, y : located_in(x, y) =
def part_of(region_of(x), region_of(y)) (2)
According to this, the located_ in relation holds between
any two entities that occupy the same region. We do not
discuss here whether it makes sense – according to our
definitions – to talk about the location of an occurrent in
another occurrent, or about an continuant in an occur-
rent. The only case we consider here concerns the location
of a continuant in another one, or the location of an
occurrent in a continuant. Location can also be asserted
between regions since, according to BIT,
∀x : region_of(region_of(x)) = region_of(x)( 3 )
We complete the picture by adding location_of, the
inverse relation of located_in. Since the region occupied
by a part of an object is always part_of the region occu-
pied by the including whole, it follows that the relation
part_of is a specialization of the relation located_in:
∀x, y : part_of(x, y) ⇒ located_in(x, y)( 4 )
∀x, y : has_part(x, y) ⇒ location_of(x, y)
The relation located_in is further subdivided into part_of
and contained_in. If an object is contained_in another
one it is located_in it without being part of it. A distinc-
tion between part_of and contained_in is only possible
for location between Objects, cf. [41].
∀x, y : contained_in(x, y) =def  (5)
instance_of(x, Object) ∧ instance_of(y, Object)
 ∧ located_in(x, y) ∧ ¬part_of(x, y)( 6 )
It still remains difficult to distinguish parthood from loca-
tion in an objective manner. In [41] we proposed a set of
criteria which help decide whether a location relation
between two objects a and b can be refined to a parthood
relation. One criterion is the consideration of the objects'
lifecycles. If a  is always located_in  b, then it can be
regarded as part_of b. Another criterion we proposed is
functionality. If a is located_in b and a functionally con-
tributes to b then a is part_of b, at least if the function is
affected when a is missing. Especially the latter criterion
depends on an ontologically stable approach to biological
function which is still due.
Finally, we introduce the primitive OBO relation pair
participant_of  and  has_participant. This relation is
asserted whenever biological objects are "participants" of
an occurrent Unfortunately, OBO only vaguely character-
izes this relation, namely "a primitive instance-level relation
between a process, a continuant, and a time at which the con-
tinuant participates in some way in the process. The relation
obtains, for example, when this particular process of oxygen
exchange across this particular alveolar membrane
has_participant this particular sample of hemoglobin at this
particular time" [34]. We here understand the participation
relation as a common subsumer of the 'agent' and
'patient' relations, as known from verb semantics [13].
Here, the agent is the instigator of an action, and the
patient is the entity that undergoes any impact of an
action or an event. We consider the relation
has_participant in the context of biomedicine to relate a
biological occurrent to those objects that are directly
involved in it. For instance, a phosphorylation event has a
kinase, a PO4 group, and an organic molecule as partici-
pants. Direct involvement has an important corrollary:
The extension of participating objects is limited to the
region where the occurrent is located. Therefore, if a single
membrane protein is phosphorylated, neither the whole
membrane nor the whole cell are considered participants
of this phosphorylation event. In a similar vein, if a toe is
amputated, the toe itself but not the whole foot acts as a
participant.BMC Bioinformatics 2007, 8:134 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2105/8/134
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Fig. 4 depicts the taxonomy of the relations which we use
throughout this paper. Note that we have restricted our-
selves to binary relations and that we ignore – for the sake
of simplicity – the dimension of time. The relations follow
the OBO suggestions, as introduced by [44], as well as the
BIT, suggested by [11].
3.4 Patterns of Taxonomic and Partonomic Reasoning
We now address ourselves to the main topic of this paper,
viz. the discussion how taxonomic and partonomic rea-
soning patterns interact and how plausible inferences can
be drawn.
While reasoning in taxonomic hierarchies is relatively
well understood – each instance of a specific class is also
an instance of any more general class, and thus inherits all
of its properties [24] – we lack an equal form of consensus
for part/whole-related reasoning (cf. [4] for a survey).
The embedding of part/whole-related reasoning into
more general mereological reasoning, i.e., the relation
between parts and wholes and the space they occupy, are
difficult issues in the construction of formal ontologies
[10,11,38,41]. This is especially relevant when it comes to
the representation of biological occurrents and their
dependence on biological objects.
A frequently mentioned reasoning pattern is the so-called
role propagation along mereological hierarchies. The
importance of this problem is well accepted. It has led to
the introduction of dedicated constructors in early knowl-
edge representation languages, such as transfersThru in
CycL [22] and specializedBy in GRAIL [28]. In a nutshell,
role propagation is a reasoning phenomenon that is best
explained by the following prototypical example:
"Every instance of 'fracture of the neck of the femur' is also con-
sidered an instance of 'fracture of the femur' because every neck
of a femur is a part of some femur." [19]
Of course, this pattern is not restricted to reasoning about
medical disorders and procedures but it extends to biol-
ogy as well. So the biological occurrent of Gastrin Secretion
is considered a process located at Gastric G Cells of the Gas-
tric Mucosa, and therefore, we naturally classify it as a proc-
ess located at some Gastric Mucosa since every instance of
Gastric G Cells is part of some Gastric Mucosa.
In our previous research on biomedical knowledge repre-
sentation [36-38,41] we have already addressed this issue
extensively. We here provide a coherent account of mode-
ling parthood in biological continuants in terms of spatial
location. Based on the discussion of the nature of part-
whole relations for biological continuants, we stipulate
that for the purpose to support these inference patterns,
the relations between wholes and their associated parts
can be abstracted in terms of spatial relations, so that sub-
sumption-based reasoning patterns can be reused to prop-
agate roles across mereological hierarchies. The above
reasoning pattern, which can be paraphrased as " x, which
is related to y, is related to z as well because y is a part of z", is
equivalent to the so-called right identity rule [6]:
∀x, y, z : rel(x, y) ∧ part_of(y, z) ⇒ rel(x, z)( 7 )
The symbol rel stands for an arbitrary relation. This is
instantiated by the following examples.
￿ "Glomerulonephritis is a kind of nephritis because
glomerula are parts of kidneys and nephritis is an inflam-
matory disorder of the kidney."
￿ "Insulin production is usually considered a pancreas
process, because pancreatic beta cells are located in the
pancreas".
However, there are counterexamples:
￿ "An amputation of a toe is never a foot amputation,
although every toe is part of a foot."
￿ "Mitosis is a cell process but it is generally not seen as a
pancreas or liver process although these organs have cells
as parts."
￿ "DNA replication cannot be not subsumed by cell repli-
cation although DNA is located in a cell."
This kind of anomaly make the usefulness of right-iden-
tity rules problematic [27], since there is ample evidence
A simplified Relation Ontology for biology Figure 4
A simplified Relation Ontology for biology. Sibling relations 
are disjoint but not exhaustive.
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two classes
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two individuals 
Rel. between 
an individual 
and a class
Is_A Instance_Of
region_of
located_in
contained_in participant_of part_of
Relation
proper_
part_of
exactly_
located_inBMC Bioinformatics 2007, 8:134 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2105/8/134
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that such role inclusions do not always hold [38], as our
examples suggest.
Let us analyze another example in a more principled way:
Every instance of the class Gastroenteritis is an instance of
Inflammatory Disorder related to some instance of Digestive
Tract as a whole, and therefore, it is not identical with any
instance of the class Appendicitis, which is defined as an
Inflammatory Disorder of the Appendix – although every
instance of Appendix is part of some instance of Digestive
Tract. On the other hand, every instance of Nephritis is an
instance of Inflammatory Disorder of some instance of
either some Kidney or any of its parts. As a consequence,
the class Nephritis  subsumes  Glomerulonephritis  because
every instance of Glomerulonephritis is an Inflammatory Dis-
order of some instance of Glomerula, each of which is part
of some Kidney.
Obviously, some definitions relate to some entity type as
a whole, whereas other ones relate to the whole or any parts
of it.
In our previous work [37,38] we preferred to separately
address the class of "a whole" (the so-called E-node), the
class of "the proper parts of a whole" (the so-called P-
node), and the class of "the proper or improper parts of a
whole" (the so-called S-node).
We argued that the introduction of artificial classes
(which are defined as reifications of roles) is epistemolog-
ically valid, thus justifying the so-called SEP-triplets [42]
approach. Fig. 5 (upper part) depicts a SEP-triplet model.
Occurrents are linked to objects by a very general and not
further defined relation associated_with. The burden of rea-
soning lies on the taxonomic structure. Since Nephritis is
connected to the S-node class Kidney Structure and Glomer-
ulonephritis is connected to the S-node class Glomerulum
Structure which is subsumed by Kidney Structure, one can
infer that Glomerulonephritis is a subclass of Nephritis. This
reasoning pattern is not supported for Nephrectomy
because here the target is Kidney as a whole and not a
proper part of it. This approach was proposed in order to
overcome the lack of former terminological languages
which did not allow to directly specify algebraic proper-
ties of relations, such as transitivity or reflexivity. It has
been taken up in the meantime by clinical terminologies,
e.g. SNOMED CT [3].
However, the SEP approach is controversial mostly due to
several facts. Firstly, it requires extensive modification of
the class hierarchies. Secondly, the semantics of the extra
nodes (S-Nodes and P-nodes) is frequently misunder-
stood. (In SNOMED CT, the same medical terms are
assigned to E-nodes and S-nodes.) Finally, one can raise
objections from a standpoint of formal ontology: The SEP
model addresses (and solves) certain reasoning require-
ments in a superficial way, i.e. it does not require a formal
analysis of the relations involved.
Furthermore, there are now terminological languages
such as  , implemented in efficient reasoners, e.g.
CEL [6] which support right-identity rules.
In the following, we propose an alternative solution to
this problem where we completely refrain from compli-
cated modeling artifacts. We show instead how the
required inferences naturally derive from precise class def-
initions, using a parsimonious set of relations with well-
defined algebraic properties. We further enhance our pic-
ture by extending the approach to disposition properties
and their propagation along inclusion hierarchies.
4 A Formal Approach to Role Propagation 
across Partonomies
4.1 Integrating Taxonomic and Mereological Hierarchies
As we have shown in Section 3.1, the compositional struc-
ture of classes of biological objects cannot sufficiently be
described by one single mereological hierarchy. As much
as we can derive that an individual b has an individual a
as part, knowing that a is part of b, we cannot transfer the
same reasoning pattern to the level of classes.
Here, if we relate classes by quantified relations we can
not infer that every instance of B has always some instance
of A as part, knowing that every A is part of some B. (Using
 
Top: SEP triplet approach for role propagation Figure 5
Top: SEP triplet approach for role propagation. Bottom: 
Alternative solution with semantically clear-cut relations. The 
relations labels use description logics [5] notation.
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DL notation [5], B    ∃has_part.  A  does not imply A
∃part_of.B.)
However, to the moment, the recommendation to treat
links from the part to the whole differently from links that
point from the whole to the part – although principally
allowed at least according to the Gene Ontology usage
guidelines [15]– has not been taken up by any of the OBO
ontologies. Fig. 6 demonstrates how this might look like,
using a couple of Gene Ontology classes. The partonomic
relations between Nuclear Membrane and Cell Nucleus are
bidirectional: every Nuclear Membrane is part of some Cell
Nucleus, and every Cell Nucleus has some Nuclear Mem-
brane. This is not the case with the classes Cell, Membrane,
and Cell Projection. Not every Cell has a Cell Nucleus or a
Flagellum, Axon, or other Cell Projection, but all of them are
part of some Cell. Every Cell has some Membrane, but not
every Membrane is part of some Cell.
These subtle though important partonomic distinctions
have to be accounted for when we want to support plausi-
ble inferences involving biological objects and biological
occurrents.
When we refer to the location of biological occurrents at a
certain part of an organism or a cell we mean, more pre-
cisely, the location of this part. For this relation, we use
the predicates location_of and located_in, in their broad-
est sense, including biological occurrents or dispositions:
A biological object can therefore be the location of some
biological occurrent, e.g. every instance of a biological
occurrent P (e.g. rRNA transcription process) is located at
some physical location E (e.g. RNA Polymerase I).
∀x : instance_of(x, P) ⇒ ∃y : instance_of(y, E) 
∧ located_in(x, y)( 8 )
4.2 Inferences involving Biological Occurrents
We now provide examples for plausible inferences, com-
monly referred to as propagation of properties.
Example 1
"A nephritis is an inflammatory disorder located at a kidney as
a whole or at any of those objects which are necessarily part of
a kidney."
∀x : instance_of(x, Nephritis) ⇔ 
instance_of(x, InflammatoryDisorder) ∧ ∃y : 
instance_of(y, Kidney) ∧ located_in(x, y)( 9 )
The inference that every Glomerulonephritis is a Nephritis is
then straightforward. The statement
∀x : instance_of(x, Glomerulum) ⇒ 
∃y : instance_of(y, Kidney) ∧ located_in(x, y)
(10)
can be inferred from
∀x : instance_of(x, Glomerulum) ⇒
 ∃y : instance_of(y, Kidney) ∧ part_of(x, y)( 1 1 )
because part_of(x, y) ⇒ located_in(x, y). Glomerulonephri-
tis is defined as:
∀x : instance_of(x, Glomerulonephritis) ⇔
 instance_of(x, InflammatoryDisorder) ∧
  ∃y : instance_of(y, Glomerulum) ∧ located_in(x, y)
(12)
Due to the transitivity of the relation located_in and the
fact that every instance of Glomerulum is located in some
Kidney (Formula 10), we get:
∀x : instance_of(x, Glomerulonephritis) ⇒
 instance_of(x, Nephritis)( 1 3 )
The relation located_in is used both for the spatial loca-
tion of Glomerulum in Kidney and for the relation between
the occurrent Glomerulonephritis and Glomerulum. So it is
uniquely the transitivity property of the relation
located_in which provides the required inference.
Example 2
"Apoptosis is a kind of cell death. Tissue has cells as parts. Even
though, apoptosis is not a necrosis (tissue death)".
∀v : instance_of(v, Necrosis) ⇔ instance_of(v, Death) ∧
∃w : instance of(w, Tissue) ∧ located_in(v, w)
(14)
∀x : instance_of(x, Apoptosis) ⇒ instance_of(x, Death) ∧
∃y : instance of(y, Cell) ∧ located_in(x, y)( 1 5 )
A complete mixed taxonomy/partonomy Figure 6
A complete mixed taxonomy/partonomy. In contrast to the 
OBO ontologies, Part_Of hierarchies here do not always 
coincide with Has_Part hierarchies. The relations labels use 
description logics [5] notation.
Cell
Nucleus
Flagellum
Cell
Projection
Cell
Membrane
Nuclear
Membrane
Is_A Is_A
ූ part_of ූ part_of
ූ part_of
ූ has_part
ූ has_partBMC Bioinformatics 2007, 8:134 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2105/8/134
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The above statement would not necessarily hold if every
instance of Cell  were  part_of, and consequently
located_in, some instance of Tissue. This is not the case
because there are cells which are not part of a tissue. How-
ever we could modify the example as follows:
Example 3
"Neuron Apoptosis is a kind of cell death. Neural tissue has
cells as parts. Even though, neuron apoptosis  is not a necrosis
of neural tissue".
Using the same inference as above we would, indeed, not
be able to explain why apoptosis is not to be subsumed by
necrosis. A closer look at Formula 14 reveals that "any
death process located in some tissue" is a necrosis. Follow-
ing this definition, of course, any isolated apoptosis event
in a tissue would be equivalent to necrosis. This is cer-
tainly not what the term "necrosis" means. We will, there-
fore, have to correct the above definition, using the
relation participant_of as introduced in Section 3.3:
∀v : instance_of(v, Necrosis) ⇔ instance_of(v, Death) ∧
∃w : instance of(w, Tissue) ∧ participant_of(w, v)
(16)
For the proper definition of biological occurrents, as a
general rule, we have to carefully distinguish between a
biological object which is the location of an occurrent (i.e.
the occurrent may occur even in a small part of this
object), or biological objects which are participants of this
occurrent, e.g. they are involved in the occurrent as
wholes.
We underline this distinction by the following quite trivial
medical example:
Example 4
"Amputation of a foot is an amputation which targets a foot."
∀x : instance_of(x, Amputation Of Foot) ⇔ 
instance_of(x, Amputation) ∧ ∃y : instance of(y, Foot) ∧
participant_of(y, x) (17)
"Amputation at a foot is an amputation which is located at a
foot."
∀x : instance_of(x, AmputationAtFoot) ⇔
 instance_of(x, Amputation) ∧ 
∃y : instance of(y, Foot) ∧ located_in(x, y) (18)
As a consequence, any instance AmputationOfToe would
be an AmputationAtFoot  because every AmputationOfToe
has some Toe as participant and every Toe is located_in
some Foot, given the transitivity of the relation located_in.
Note the subtle but important semantic distinction
between the prepositions "at" or "in" (location) and "of"
(participant).
The already discussed distinction in propagation patterns
between Nephritis and Gastroenteritis can be explained by
the same terms. Whilst Nephritis is an inflammatory disor-
der "at", Gastroenteritis is not only an inflammatory disor-
der "at" but also an inflammatory disorder "of".
Therefore, Glomerulonephritis Is-A Nephritis, whereas Gas-
troenteritis  does not subsume Appendicitis. This way,
domain-specific specialized relations such as inflamma-
tion-of, fracture-of, necrosis-of, amputation-of (such as
proposed in [42]) can easily be reduced to a small set of
foundational relations, such as participant_of  and
located_in, an argument perfectly in line with the require-
ment of parsimony formulated in [44].
Finally, the propagation patterns fundamentally depends
on the distinction between the direction of the class-level
partonomic relation, such as illustrated in Fig. 6 and dis-
cussed in Section 4.1. This explains the reason why Mitosis
is not a Liver process although every Liver has instances of
Cell  as parts. The explanation is that whereas for each
instance of Liver there are instances of Cell and Mitosis, not
every  Cell  is part of a Liver, and therefore not every
instance of Mitosis is located at some instance of Liver.
4.3 An Attempt to Generalize
The two reasoning patterns, which had been accounted
for in the SEP approach (cf. Fig. 5) by relating to the S-
nodes (for enabling propagation) or to the E-nodes (for
obviating propagation) can be reconstructed as follows.
First of all, we reinterpret the additional nodes in a
straightforward way. The P-nodes for parts are axioma-
tized as reificators of the relation proper_part_of:
∀p : instance_of(p, XP) ⇔ (∃x : instance_of(x, X) ∧
proper_part_of(p, x)) (19)
while the S nodes as reificators of the relation part_of, for-
malized as follows:
∀s : instance_of(s, XS) ⇔ (∃x : instance_of(x, X) ∧
part_of(s, x)) (20)
The subsumption of P-nodes by S-nodes can be deduced
from the fact that proper_part_of implies part_of.
As the relation part_of implies located_in, we obtain the
following implication for P-nodes:
∀p : instance_of(p, XP) ⇒ (∃x : instance_of(x, X) ∧
located_in(p, x)) (21)BMC Bioinformatics 2007, 8:134 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2105/8/134
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and for the S nodes accordingly:
∀x : instance_of(s, XS) ⇒ (∃x : instance_of(x, X) ∧
located_in(s, x)) (22)
Consequently, by using the same relation located_in to
relate an occurrent with a continuant (instead of using the
ill-defined relation associated_with), we obtain the con-
clusion that an occurrent located at anything subsumed
by XS, viz. an occurrent located at any part of some X is
located at some X  due to the transitivity property of
located_in.
Thus, the propagation of properties is a natural conse-
quence of generalizing the notion of "location". If a proc-
ess p is located_in x and x is located_in y (which is the
consequence of x being part_of y), then the process p is
located_in y, as well. Coming back to the example in Fig.
5, every instance of Glomerulonephritis is located_in some
Glomerula, all Glomerula are part of some Kidney and there-
fore they are located_in some Kidney. Due to the defini-
tion of Nephritis as a disorder located_in some Kidney, we
get the terminological inference that every Glomerulone-
phritis is a Nephritis.
How can we deal now with the "anomalous" cases? A
closer look at these cases reveals that they always target
some object as a whole. For instance, Nephrectomy is the
removal of the whole kidney, while any partial removal of
kidney tissue, e.g. in a biopsy, must not be classified as
Nephrectomy.
Now the OBO relation participant_of  comes into the
play. As shown in Fig. 5, the node denoting a disease class
is linked by this relation to the node denoting the class of
biological objects. Again, we have to substitute the fuzzy
relation  associated_with  relation by a canonical one.
Since participant_of is not a subrelation of located_in,
there is no inference pattern as with the Glomerulonephritis
case.
One might still have reservations against the use of the
relation participant_of, basically due to the lack of a clear
definition. In this case, a solution would be to introduce
the relation exactly_located_in, according to [10], which
is defined as the exact coincidence of two regions.
∀x, y : exactly_located_in(x, y) =def (region_of(x)
 = region_of(y)) (23)
Thus, we continue arguing on the level of spatial relations,
without any hidden assumptions which may occur when
using an ill-defined relation such as participant_of. Since
exactly_located_in is a stricter relation than located_in,
the role propagation is obviated. The effect is the same,
and the use of exactly_located_in might indeed be pre-
ferred due to its semantic clarity. On the other hand,
participant_of has been proposed as a foundational rela-
tion for bio-ontologies, so that there are good reasons to
choose this one. However, this relation is still fuzzy and a
substantial clarification of its semantics is due.
5 Conclusion
This paper deals with two major issues. The first one is
concerned with ontological considerations underlying the
substitutability of part-whole by locational relations, in
accordance with the OBO (Open Biological Ontologies)
Relation Ontology. For physical domains at least, it seems
evident to get rid of the ongoing debate about different
forms of part-whole reasoning and its underpinnings by
abstracting away from part_of/has_part and describing
the composition of physical objects in terms of locational
relations, viz. located_in and its inverse location_of.
The second issue has to do with typical inferences drawn
in the biomedical domain, viz. the propagation of
attributes across partonomies. We here propose a straight-
forward solution where the relation pair located_in/
location_of is used not only to express the spatial rela-
tionships between biological objects and spaces but also
between occurrents and biological objects. Further work
should extend this framework to include biological func-
tions, qualities and dispositions [20,40], as well.
Thus we do refrain from additional formal language con-
structs in order to obtain the desired inferences (propaga-
tion of properties across compositional hierarchies)
which are needed in such a reasoning framework. This
way, we combine ontological clarity with formal simplic-
ity and descriptional parsimony. We have used first order
logics for our formalisms but it can easily be demon-
strated that our use of FOL expressiveness translates into
OWL-DL [25], the description logics [5] standard of the
Semantic Web. The chosen approach is currently used for
a principled redesign of the anatomy part of SNOMED CT
[3]. There is preliminary evidence that newly designed ter-
minological reasoners [6] are able to efficiently deal with
such structures, so that the previous SEP triplet approach
– introduced mainly for the purpose to enable efficient
computation – can be abandoned.
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